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Hay: Second Amendment & Undocumented Immigrants

THE SECOND AMENDMENT, UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRANTS,
AND THE SHIFTING DEFINITION OF “PEOPLE”: HOW THE
FEDERAL GUN CONTROL ACT OF 1968 PREVENTS
UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRANTS FROM EXERCISING SECOND
AMENDMENT RIGHTS
Justin Hay

I. INTRODUCTION
After being brought to the United States by your family over two
decades ago, you decide to purchase a firearm to exercise your Second
Amendment right to bear arms. Learning about the Bill of Rights has
inspired you with a sense of patriotism and you believe that the Second
Amendment provides a right that all people should be free to exercise.
While not an outspoken advocate of the Second Amendment, you do
believe that firearms should be able to be used for protection.
Unfortunately, on a night out on the town, you get caught up in a
confrontation with another patron of a local establishment. After the
confrontation, the police search your car and find the firearm you
previously purchased in the glove compartment. Initially, the possession
of a weapon does not seem to be problematic.
During the police interrogation, it becomes apparent that you do not
possess the requisite documents to live and work in the United States. In
addition to becoming concerned about possible deportation, you are
informed by law enforcement that the mere possession of a firearm by
an undocumented alien is a violation of the Federal Gun Control Act of
1968 (“Act”).1 Confused, you ask how the Act is permitted to restrict
your rights under the Second Amendment. After inquiring further, you
begin to realize that the people referred to in the Second Amendment
does not apply to you. Although you have contributed to your local
community for years, the country that you call home considers you an
uninvited guest.
There are two issues that provide an ongoing debate among American
citizens regardless of the sitting President, or the composition of
Congress. The legislation of firearms and the legislation regulating the
presence of undocumented immigrants that reside in the United States
are two issues that are perpetually entrenched in the minds of many
Americans. The increased frequency of mass shootings, contrasted by
forces resistant to any legislation regarding ammunition provide the

1. 18 U.S.C. §922 (g)(5).
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framework for an intense conversation.2 Similarly, poor economic
conditions and the lack of sufficient employment opportunities for
American citizens have caused many to blame immigrants, specifically
undocumented immigrants, for the lack of opportunities.3
Congress seemingly had both topics in mind upon introducing the Act
in 1968.4 While the prohibition of firearm possession within the Act is
not limited to undocumented immigrants, 18 U.S.C. 922 (g)(5) (“922
(g)(5)”) of the Act specifically targets undocumented immigrants.5
Enacted with the purpose of “keep[ing] guns out of the hands of
presumptively risky people[,]”6 922 (g)(5) provides, in pertinent part,
that:
[i]t shall be unlawful for any person who, being an alien is illegally
or unlawfully in the United States . . . to . . . possess in or affecting
commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or
ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or
foreign commerce.7
The underlying premise of the Act is pitted directly against the
Second Amendment, which provides that:
“A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free
State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be
infringed.”8
In District of Columbia v. Heller, the Supreme Court held that the
Second Amendment guarantees an individual right to possess and carry

2. Bonnie Berkowitz, Denise Lu, and Chris Alcantara, The Terrible Numbers That Grow with
Each
Mass
Shooting,
WASHINGTON
POST,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2018/national/mass-shootings-inamerica/?utm_term=.17672ebe39bd (last visited Feb. 16, 2018); Leigh Ann Caldwell and Andrew
Rafferty, Familiar Responses from Congress in Wake of the Latest Mass Shooting, NBC News,
https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/congress/familiar-responses-congress-wake-latest-mass-shootingn848326 (last visited Feb. 16, 2018).
3. Stuart Anderson, With 6 Million Job Openings, Will Critics Still Blame Immigrants for
Taking Jobs’ From Americans?, FORBES, https://www.forbes.com/sites/stuartanderson/2017/06/24/with6-million-job-openings-will-critics-still-blame-immigrants-for-taking-jobs-fromamericans/#21f8ed3a53da (last visited Feb. 16, 2018).
4. 18 U.S.C. §922 (g)(5) (1968) (the Act is enforced by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,
Firearms and Explosives (“ATF”)).
5. 18 U.S.C. §922 (g) (the Act also prohibits felons, the mentally ill, and individuals with a
history of committing domestic violence).
6. U.S. v. Meza-Rodriguez, 798 F.3d 664, 673 (7th Cir. 2015).
7. 18 U.S.C. § 922 (g)(5) (1968) (alien is defined in 8 USC 1101 (a)(3) as “any person not a
citizen or national of the United States”).
8. U.S. Const. amend. II.
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weapons.9 In issuing its decision in Heller, the Court did not specify
whether or not the “people” referenced in the Second Amendment
included immigrants residing in the United States without
documentation.10 Unlike the First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments, it
remains unclear whether or not the Second Amendment applies to
undocumented immigrants in the United States.
Prior to assessing the tests that should be applied in determining
whether the Second Amendment applies to undocumented immigrants,
this article briefly reviews the history of the Second Amendment.
Throughout the analysis of the Second Amendment, this article will
contemplate the meaning of “people” within the context of the
Constitution. The article will then analyze the most recent decisions of
the Fifth and Seventh Circuits that have created a circuit split related to
922 (g)(5)’s prohibition of the possession of firearms by undocumented
immigrants. After analyzing the circuit split, this article then analyzes
the impact of the level of scrutiny applied to the Act in addition to
analyzing the relationship between the Commerce Clause and the Act.
This article does not seek to address any of the policy concerns or
issues regarding the constitutionality of the Second Amendment; rather,
this article addresses the constitutional issues surrounding the Act’s
application to individuals residing in the United States without
documentation. Additionally, this article does not intend to address or
analyze the effectiveness of any immigration policy.
II. BACKGROUND
The definition of people in the Constitution is disputed within the
context of the Second Amendment. This section of the article will
discuss the source of the confusion as to which individuals belong to the
“people” in addition to providing background to the relevant cases in
analyzing the circuit split between the Fifth and Seventh Circuits. Next,
this section will discuss the background regarding the level of scrutiny
to be applied in analyzing the Act. Finally, this section will present an
alternative view of the Act, as a whole, within the scope of the
Commerce Clause.

9. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S.Ct. 2783 (U.S. 2008).
10. See id.
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A. Undocumented Immigrants as “Non-people”
i. The Second Amendment
The Supreme Court’s most recent interpretation of the Second
Amendment in Heller provides a framework for the application of 922
(g)(5) to undocumented immigrants.11 Heller, a police officer in the
District of Columbia (“D.C.”), attempted to register a handgun to be
kept at home, but was prohibited from doing so by a D.C. law that
required residents to keep lawfully owned firearms unloaded and
dissembled or bound by a trigger lock.12 Heller sued D.C., claiming that
the law violated the Second Amendment by essentially banning the use
of handguns within the home.13 Heller argued that the requirement–that
handguns be kept unloaded while in the home–was fundamentally a
handgun ban within the homes of D.C. residents.14
The Court famously held that the District of Columbia law was a
violation of the Second Amendment.15 The Court stated that the “Second
Amendment protects an individual right to possess a firearm
unconnected with service in a militia, and to use that arm for a
traditionally lawful purpose, such as self-defense within the home.”16
The Court, perhaps predicting over-zealous reactions to the central
holding, also provided that the Second Amendment right was not
unlimited; “[i]t is not a right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever
and for whatever purpose.”17 Foreshadowing the uncertainty of its
decision, the Court qualified its holding by stating that the opinion does
not “cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of
firearms by felons and the mentally ill . . . .”18
While the Court provided tight parameters on its Heller decision, the
Court neglected to narrowly define the application of the Second
Amendment to undocumented immigrants.19 In an attempt to qualify its
holding, the Court hinted that laws prohibiting felons and the mentally
ill from possessing firearms would not be a violation of the Second
Amendment.20 Unfortunately, the application of the qualifying
statements to undocumented immigrants is also unclear. Under 8 U.S.C
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

See id.
See id. at 2875.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 2821.
See id.
Id.
Id.
See id.
See id.
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§ 1325 (a), aliens who unlawfully enter the United States are not subject
to more than six months imprisonment, otherwise characterized as a
misdemeanor.21 Without more, undocumented immigrants have
committed a misdemeanor by entering the United States unlawfully.
Unless an undocumented immigrant commits other crimes while in the
United States, the Court’s qualifying language in Heller does not
expressly apply to immigrants whose only crime was remaining in the
United States unlawfully. To summarize the impact of the Heller
decision on 922 (g)(5), the Court did not expressly restrict the Second
Amendment rights of undocumented immigrants.
ii. The Fourth Amendment
The Supreme Court’s decision in Verdugo-Urquidez clarifies the
definition of the “people” as meant within the Fourth Amendment.22 In
Verdugo-Urquidez, the Court held that the Fourth Amendment did not
protect a non-citizen brought involuntarily to the United States against a
search of foreign property.23 Rene Martin Verdugo-Urquidez, a citizen
and resident of Mexico, was suspected by the United States Drug
Enforcement Agency (“DEA”) of being a leader of an organization
known to smuggle narcotics into the United States.24 After obtaining a
warrant for Mr. Verdugo-Urquidez’ arrest, the DEA requested Mexican
officials aid in apprehending Mr. Verdugo-Urquidez in Mexico.25
Mexican officials complied with the request and transported Mr.
Verdugo-Urquidez to the California border where Mr. VerdugoUrquidez was arrested by United States officials.26 Subsequent to Mr.
Verdugo-Urquidez’ arrest, the DEA worked with Mexican officials to
search Mr. Verdugo-Urquidez’ residence in Mexico.27 Mr. VerdugoUrquidez sought to suppress the evidence discovered in the search of the
residence based on the fact that the DEA completed the search without a
warrant as required by the Fourth Amendment.28
The Court rejected Mr. Verdugo-Urquidez’ argument, holding that
“‘the people’ protected by the Fourth Amendment, and by the First and
Second Amendments, . . . refers to a class of persons who are part of a
national community or who have otherwise developed a substantial

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

8 U.S.C § 1325 (a).
See U.S. v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990).
See id. at 259.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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connection with this country to be considered part of that community.”29
In the Court’s opinion, Mr. Verdugo-Urquidez did not develop a
substantial connection with the United States to be protected by the
Fourth Amendment because Mr. Verdugo-Urquidez did not reside in the
United States or accept any societal obligations in the United States. 30 In
order to be protected by the Fourth Amendment, Mr. Verdugo-Urquidez
must have shown “substantial connections” to the United States.31
Verdugo-Urquidez provided a clear rule in the application of the
Fourth Amendment to undocumented immigrants. Undocumented
immigrants must have substantial connections to the community to be
protected by the Fourth Amendment.32 Verdugo-Urquidez also
implicitly provided the understanding that the “people” under the Fourth
Amendment refers to the same class of people that are afforded the
rights of the Second Amendment.33
iii. Circuit Split: Fifth Circuit – United States v. Portillo-Munoz34
The Fifth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Portillo-Munoz
excluded undocumented immigrants from the definition of “people”
within the Second Amendment.35 On July 10, 2010, the Castro County
Sheriff’s department was informed of a person riding around on a
motorcycle with a handgun in his waistband.36 Upon arrival, police
discovered Armando Portillo-Munoz, an undocumented immigrant
working and living in Dimmit, Texas, on a motorcycle.37 Police arrested
Mr. Portillo-Munoz after discovering a handgun in his motorcycle.38
Following the arrest, Mr. Portillo-Munoz admitted to being in the United
States unlawfully and was indicted under 922 (g)(5).39
Prior to the arrest, Mr. Portillo-Munoz had been in the United States
for eighteen months working as a ranch hand.40 Although Mr. PortilloMunoz admitted to possessing a firearm that had been transported in

29. See id. at 265.
30. See id.
31. Martinez-Ageuro v. Gonzalez, 459 F.3d 618, 625 (2008) (the Court defined “substantial
connections” as whether or not the person i) is in the United States on their own accord; and ii) has
accepted some societal obligations).
32. See Verdugo-Urquidez at 265.
33. See id.
34. U.S. v. Portillo-Munoz, 643 F.3d 437 (5th Cir. 2011).
35. See id.
36. See id. at 439.
37. See id.
38. See id.
39. See id.
40. See id.
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interstate commerce, Mr. Portillo-Munoz stated that the handgun was
obtained solely to protect the chickens on the ranch from coyotes.41
After being sentenced to ten months in prison followed by three years of
supervised release, Mr. Portillo-Munoz appealed the decision, arguing
that the Act violated the Second Amendment.42 While there is no doubt
that Mr. Portillo-Munoz was in violation of 922 (g)(5) as written, Mr.
Portillo-Munoz argued that the Act itself was unconstitutional.43
The Fifth Circuit applied the Heller and Verdugo-Urquidez decisions
to come to the holding that 922 (g)(5) does not violate the
Constitution.44 The court reasoned that undocumented immigrants were
not “law-abiding” citizens to which the Heller decision provided an
individual right to possess firearms.45 Furthermore, the majority held
that the “people” did not have the same meaning in the Second and
Fourth Amendments.46 The majority likened the “untraceable” quality of
undocumented immigrants to criminals that could disappear without a
trace after committing a crime.47 After concluding that the Constitution
does not prevent Congress from distinguishing “between citizens and
aliens and between lawful and illegal aliens,” the majority held that 922
(g)(5) did not violate the Second Amendment.48
Notably in Portillo-Munoz, Judge Dennis wrote a fiery dissent. The
dissent criticized the majority’s conclusion that the “people” referenced
in the Second and Fourth Amendments are dissimilar.49 The precedent
that “non-persons” do not have the right to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures under the Fourth Amendment would leave
millions of undocumented immigrants vulnerable to abuse from law
enforcement or other members of society.50
Importantly, Judge Dennis’ dissent notes that both the MartinezAguero and Verdugo-Urquidez standards were satisfied by Mr. PortilloMunoz, who had been in the United States for eighteen months, had a
job, and supported a family.51 In Martinez-Aguero, the Fifth Circuit held
that an undocumented immigrant that frequently crossed the border had
a substantial connection to the United States in order to be protected by

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 442.
See id. at 440.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 442.
See id. at 443.
See id. at 448.
See id. at 447.

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2018

7

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 87, Iss. 2 [2018], Art. 7

578

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 87

the Fourth Amendment.52 The Martinez-Aguero court further stated that
the “standard for establishing substantial connections is not high and
that there would be few, if any, cases where an alien who was
voluntarily within the United States would be unable to establish such
connections.”53 Under the Martinez-Aguero test, Mr. Portillo-Munoz
established substantial connections by (i) voluntarily remaining in the
United States and (ii) accepting societal obligations.54
Judge Dennis’ dissent crucially highlights that the majority’s opinion
effectively implies that American citizens that have committed serious
crimes are afforded the rights of the Second Amendment while
undocumented immigrants with substantial connections to the
community who have only committed a misdemeanor are left in the cold
by the Second Amendment.55
In another prosecution of an undocumented immigrant under 922
(g)(5), Mariano Meza challenged the constitutionality of the Act under
two categories: a facial challenge and an as-applied challenge.56 Mr.
Meza’s facial challenge to the constitutionality of the statute argued that
the “people” referenced in the Second Amendment are in fact the same
“people” referenced in the First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments.57
Unfortunately for Mr. Meza, the court cited Portillo-Munoz noting that
“[t]he courts have made clear that the Constitution does not prohibit
Congress from making laws that distinguish between citizens and aliens
and between lawful and illegal aliens.”58 Crucially, the court highlighted
that there is no reason to believe that the prohibition on the possession
of firearms by undocumented immigrants would be interpreted any
differently than other provisions found in 18 USC 922 (g) (“922 (g)”)
that, inter alia, prohibit felons and the mentally ill from possessing
firearms.
In arguing that 922 (g)(5) is unconstitutional as-applied to
undocumented immigrants, Mr. Meza pleaded the court to analyze the
constitutionality of the Act under heightened scrutiny. Understanding
that heightened scrutiny was required, the court applied intermediate
scrutiny, which requires that “the government has the burden of
demonstrating that its objective is an important one and that its objective
is advanced by means substantially related to that objective.”59
52. See id. at 446.
53. See id. at 446-7.
54. See id. at 443.
55. See id. at 447.
56. U.S. v. Meza, 2014 US Dist. LEXIS 50485 (E.D. Wis. 2014).
57. Id. (it is well settled that the First and Fourth Amendments utilize a broad definition of
“people” that includes undocumented immigrants).
58. Id. at 12-13.
59. Id. at 16.
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Reasoning that the government’s objective of “keeping guns out of the
hands of presumptively risky people” was important, the court held that
a prohibition on Mr. Meza’s possession of firearms was substantially
related to the government’s important objective of suppressing armed
violence.60
B. Undocumented Immigrants as “People”
i. Circuit Split: Seventh Circuit – United States v. Meza-Rodriguez61
Mariano Meza-Rodriguez was brought to the United States by his
family when he was roughly five years old.62 Approximately two
decades after arriving in the United States, on August 24, 2013, Mr.
Meza-Rodriguez was arrested by Milwaukee Police after allegedly
pointing a handgun at a patron of a neighborhood bar.63 Similar to Mr.
Portillo-Munoz, Mr. Meza-Rodriguez was later indicted for a violation
of 922 (g)(5).64 After pleading guilty pursuant to an agreement with the
government, Mr. Meza-Rodriguez was promptly removed to Mexico.65
Since Mr. Meza-Rodriguez was removed to Mexico, the case adds an
additional dimension: determining whether or not Mr. Meza-Rodriguez’
violation of the Act was a crime involving moral turpitude, which would
result in a permanent bar from the United States.66 Mr. Meza-Rodriguez
appealed to the Seventh Circuit with an argument substantially similar to
Mr. Portillo-Munoz; the basis of Mr. Meza-Rodriguez’ appeal argued
that 922 (g)(5) infringes on rights available under the Second
Amendment.67
The Seventh Circuit also relied on Verdugo-Urquidez to establish that
the “people” protected by the Second and Fourth Amendments means
persons that have established a substantial connection to the United
States.68 The Seventh Circuit also relied on Martinez-Aguero’s two part
test to determine if Mr. Meza-Rodriguez established a substantial
connection by (i) remaining in the United States voluntarily and (ii)
accepting some societal obligations.69 In applying the first prong of the

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

18 U.S.C. §922 (g).
U.S. v. Meza-Rodriguez, 798 F.3d 664 (7th Cir. 2015).
See id. at 666.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 667.
See id. at 667-78; 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I).
See id. at 667.
See id. at 670.
See id.
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Martinez-Aguero test, the court confidently held that Mr. MezaRodriguez was clearly in the United States voluntarily after residing in
the United States for over twenty years.70 The court also determined the
second prong of the Martinez-Aguero test was satisfied due to Mr.
Meza-Rodriguez’ deep connections as a resident of the United States.71
The fact that Mr. Meza-Rodriguez’ past left a lot to be desired did not
sway the court in determining that the substantial connections standard
was met.72
The Seventh Circuit’s opinion, as it relates to the application of the
Second and Fourth Amendments to undocumented immigrants, provides
a liberal, inclusive definition of “the people.”73 Since the Second and
Fourth Amendments use “people” in the same manner, the Seventh
Circuit found that there is no carve-out for the non-application of the
Second Amendment to undocumented immigrants; this “on-again, offagain protection” is surely not what the Framers of the Constitution
intended. 74
While the Seventh Circuit found that Mr. Meza-Rodriguez was
definitely afforded the protection of the Second and Fourth
Amendments, the court conceded that the Heller decision dictated that
the availability of the Second Amendment was “not unlimited.”75 The
Court in Heller left the door open for future courts to find against
“people” in Mr. Meza-Rodriguez’ position without removing the
constitutional rights of undocumented immigrants.76 The Seventh
Circuit reviewed the constitutionality of 922 (g)(5) through the lens of
intermediate scrutiny. To re-iterate, intermediate scrutiny requires that
all provisions of the Act serve an important governmental objective and
have a substantial relation to the specified governmental objective.77
Therefore, the stated purpose of the Act, “keep[ing] guns out of the
hands of presumptively risky people,” must have a substantial relation to
the governmental objective of protecting the public from gun violence
by maintaining the ability to track guns.78
The Seventh Circuit accepted the government’s argument that the Act
is related to the objective of tracking the movement of guns because
undocumented immigrants are able to easily evade detection by law

70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

See id. at 670-1.
See id. at 671.
See id. at 672.
See id. at 671-2.
See id. at 671.
See Heller at 2876.
See id.
See Meza-Rodriguez at 672.
See id. at 673.

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol87/iss2/7

10

Hay: Second Amendment & Undocumented Immigrants

2018]

SECOND AMENDMENT & UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRANTS

581

enforcement.79 The court added to the argument by reasoning that
undocumented immigrants have evaded law enforcement by entering the
United States illegally, therefore undocumented immigrants have
“already disrespected the law.”80
ii. The Fourteenth Amendment
The long-standing holding reached by the Court in Yick-Wo v.
Hopkins81 provides the relevant analysis to determine whether or not
certain legislation as-applied to a certain group requires a heightened
level of scrutiny. In Yick-Wo, Chinese natives seeking to operate laundry
businesses in California complied with all fire safety and health
regulations, yet were still found to have violated city ordinances. In
seeking waivers to operate in violation of the ordinances, over twohundred Chinese business owners had petitions denied, while only one
petition by a non-Chinese business owner was denied. This clear
discriminatory impact prompted the Court to state that while the city
ordinances did not facially violate the Fourteenth Amendment rights of
the Chinese business owners, the application of the ordinances was
carried out “with a mind so unequal and oppressive as to amount to a
practical denial by the State of equal protection of the laws.” 82 By
holding that “the Fourteenth Amendment . . . is not confined to the
protection of citizens,” the Court confirmed the application of the
Fourteenth Amendment to all people within the United States.
Both the Fifth and Seventh Circuits have applied the central tenet of
Yick-Wo that requires laws to be equal facially and as-applied.83 The
fear of “selective enforcement” drives the decision in Yick-Wo and all
courts that require the equal application of the laws. Crucially, the
Seventh Circuit highlighted the main concern behind the Yick-Wo
decision in Abcarian v. McDonald by affirming that equal protection
claims are allowed in scenarios where laws are not applied equally
because of the fear that “individuals with discretion in law enforcement
will take advantage of that discretion to oppress unpopular groups.”84

79. See id.
80. See id. at 673; Tyler v. Hillsdale County Sheriff’s Dep’t, 775 F.3d 308 (6th Cir. 2014)(while
this decision has received negative treatment from subsequent cases, the argument to apply strict
scrutiny for undocumented immigrants is stronger because the Act facially discriminates based on
national origin).
81. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 US 356 (1886).
82. Yick Wo, 118 US at 373.
83. Mahone v. Addicks Utility Dist., 836 F.2d 921, 932 (5th Cir. 1988); Abacarian v. McDonald,
617 F.3d 931, 940 (7th Cir. 2010).
84. Abcarian, 617 F.3d at 940.
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C. The Commerce Clause
In both Portillo-Munoz and Meza-Rodriguez, the defendants did not
take advantage of the opportunity to test the constitutionality of the Act
under the Commerce Clause. Under the Commerce Clause, Congress is
granted the power “to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and
among the several states, and with the Indian tribes.”85 Modern
Commerce Clause doctrine derives from the Supreme Court’s analysis
of the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 (“GFSZA”) in United States
v. Lopez.86 In Lopez, the Court held that the GFSZA was a violation of
Congress’ power under the Commerce Clause. Strikingly similar to 922
(g)(5), the Gun-Free School Zones Act “prohibit[ed] any individual
knowingly to possess a firearm at a place that the individual knows, or
has reasonable cause to believe, is a school zone . . . .”87 Alfonso Lopez
Jr., then a 12th grade student, was arrested for carrying a concealed
firearm within a school zone subsequent to the police receiving an
anonymous tip.88 Mr. Lopez was charged with violating the Gun-Free
School Zones Act after similar state law charges were dismissed.89
With the majority opinion for the Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist
outlined a three part test to determine if the GFSZA was a violation of
Congress’ power under the Commerce Clause.90 Under the three part
test, Congress’ is permitted to use its Commerce Clause powers in order
to regulate (i) the use of the channels of interstate commerce; (ii) the
instrumentalities of interstate commerce; and (iii) activities having a
substantial relation to interstate commerce.91 The third prong of the test
outlined by Chief Justice Rehnquist dictated the outcome of Lopez.92
The Court found that the mere possession of a firearm within a school
zone did not have a substantial relation to interstate commerce.93 The
government in Lopez adopted the “costs of crime” theory that required
many inferences to connect the possession of firearms to economic
activity.94 In short, the government’s theory provided that firearms
within school zones will make the community as a whole less attractive,
leading to lower interest in the properties surrounding the school, which
85. US Constitution Article 1, Section 8, Clause 3.
86. US v. Lopez, 514 US 549; 18 U.S.C. 921(a)(25)(interestingly enough, Congress decided to
amend the Act and include the amended section within the same section as the Act).
87. Id. at 551.
88. Id. at 551.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 558-559.
91. Id.
92. See id.
93. Id at 561.
94. Id. at 564.
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would in turn lead to the property values of the homes in the
surrounding area to decrease.95
The Court did not find a sufficient nexus between the possession of a
firearm within a school zone and economic activity.96 Chief Justice
Rehnquist rejected that the government’s argument that the mere
possession of a firearm within a school zone substantially affected the
economic activity of the surrounding area or interstate commerce.97 In
applying the third prong of the three part test outlined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist held that “[t]he possession of a gun in a local school zone is
in no sense an economic activity that might . . . substantially affect any
sort of interstate commerce.”98
The Court specifically noted that 922 (g) of the Act does not have a
strong enough connection to economic activity to fall within the scope
of Congress’ Commerce Clause power.99 Foreshadowing other
applications of 922 (g), the Court stated that “the statute contained no
express jurisdictional element which might limit its reach to a discrete
set of firearm possessions that additionally have an explicit connection
with or effect on interstate commerce.”100
922 (g) is a criminal statute that by its terms has nothing to do with
"commerce" or any sort of economic enterprise, however broadly
one might define those terms. . . . It cannot, therefore, be sustained
under our cases upholding regulations of activities that arise out of
or are connected with a commercial transaction, which viewed in
the aggregate, substantially affects interstate commerce.101
United States v. Morrison provided another opportunity for the Court
to implement Chief Justice Rehnquist’s three part test in analyzing
Congress’ power under the Commerce Clause.102 Morrison required the
Court to interpret a provision of the Violence Against Women Act
(“VAWA”) that provided a civil remedy to the victims of gender
motivated violence.103 The underlying facts, while tragic, provide the
foundation for the Courts analysis of Congress’ Commerce Clause
95. Id.
96. See id. at 561.
97. See id.
98. Id. at 567 (emphasis added).
99. See id. at 562.
100. Id. at 562.
101. Id. at 561 (Section 922 is the same section as the Act).
102. See US v. Morrison, 529 US 598 (2000).
103. Id.; 42 U.S.C. 13981 (“[a] person . . . who commits a crime of violence motivated by gender .
. . shall be liable to the party injured, in an action for the recovery of compensatory and punitive
damages, injunctive and declaratory relief, and such other relief as a court may deem appropriate.”).
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power under the circumstances. Christy Brzonkala, a former student
enrolled at Virginia Tech University (“Tech”) was sexually assaulted by
Antonio Morrison and James Crawford, members of the varsity football
team.104 After failing to obtain justice through the disciplinary process at
Tech, Ms. Brzonkala sued Morrison, Crawford, and Tech under VAWA
§ 13981.105 Morrison and Crawford moved to dismiss the suit based on
the theory that the civil remedy provided under VAWA was
unconstitutional as a violation of Congress’ Commerce Clause power.106
Ms. Brzonkala’s claim quickly elevated through the courts with both
the district court and court of appeals holding that Congress did not have
the authority to enact VAWA § 13981; the Supreme Court granted
certiorari to determine if VAWA § 13981 should be invalidated.107
Chief Justice Rehnquist analyzed the pertinent section of VAWA using
the same three part test applied in Lopez.108 Once again, Chief Justice
Rehnquist emphasized that the behavior Congress attempts to regulate
must substantially affect interstate commerce.109 Similar to the “costs of
crime” theory in Lopez, the government in Morrison argued that the
aggregation of gender motivated crimes across the country has an
impact on economic activity.110 The thrust of the government’s
argument relied on the assumption that the cumulative impact of gender
motivated crimes around the country would have an economic impact on
interstate commerce in many indirect ways. The Court flatly rejected the
government’s argument in holding that “[g]ender-motivated crimes of
violence are not, in any sense of the phrase, economic activity.”111
Although Chief Justice Rehnquist did not establish a bright-line rule to
be applied in Commerce Clause cases, the Court stipulated that
Congress cannot regulate non-economic activity based on a cumulative
substantial effect on interstate commerce.112
III. DISCUSSION
This section will provide a solution to the divergence on the
definition of “people” between the Fifth and Seventh Circuits. This
section will also argue that the analysis of 922 (g)(5) should be

104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

Morrison, 529 US at 602.
Id. at 604.
Id.
See id. at 605.
See id. at 608-609.
See id. at 610.
See id. at 613.
Id. at 613.
See id. at 617.
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completed under the highest level of judicial scrutiny, strict scrutiny.
Finally, this section contends that Congress has abused its power under
the Commerce Clause in legislating criminal activity that does not have
a substantial effect on interstate commerce.
A. Who are the “People?”
The Fifth and Seventh Circuits disagree as to whether or not the Act
violates the Second Amendment rights of undocumented immigrants.
Notably, the dissent in the Fifth Circuit’s Portillo-Munoz decision
foreshadowed the outcome of the Seventh Circuit’s decision in MezaRodriguez.113 Underlying the decisions of the Fifth and Seventh Circuits
is the central question of whether or not undocumented immigrants are
to be included in the definition of “people” within the Second
Amendment. The dissent in Portillo-Munoz and the majority in MezaRodriguez agree that the Martinez-Aguero two-part test should be used
to determine if an undocumented immigrant has established the requisite
substantial connection to the United States as required by VerdugoUrquidez.114 The Martinez-Aguero two-part test requires courts to
answer the following two questions:
(1) Was the undocumented immigrant in the United States
voluntarily?
(2) Has the undocumented immigrant accepted some societal
obligations?115
Although the Martinez-Aguero test was initially created for the
application of the Fourth Amendment to undocumented immigrants, the
test outlines the two main areas that govern the applicability of the
Constitution to undocumented immigrants in general. While not as
liberal as the test to determine if the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment applies to a certain individual,116 the MartinezAguero test addresses the concerns of government, establishing an
undocumented immigrant’s sufficient connections to the United States,
in analyzing the applicability of the Second Amendment to
undocumented immigrants.
The first question of the Martinez-Aguero test relates to the will of the
undocumented immigrant in question. If the answer is affirmative, the
113. See Portillo-Munoz, 643 F.3d at 443.
114. See id. at 440; Meza-Rodriguez, 798 F.3d at 670.
115. Meza-Rodriguez, 798 F.3d at 670.
116. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003) (The Equal Protection Clause provides that no
State shall “deny to any person within its jurisdictions the equal protection of the laws.”).
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undocumented immigrant is viewed as an individual willing to
contribute to the United States. As in Martinez-Aguero, even if an
individual frequently crosses the border into the United States, it is more
likely that the intent of the individual is to contribute to society within
the United States rather than commit crimes. The second question of the
Martinez-Aguero test seeks to connect the undocumented immigrant’s
willingness to be in the United States with the willingness of the United
States to make the Constitution available to the undocumented
immigrant. In short, if the individual is willing to invest in the United
States, the United States is willing to invest in the individual.
The Seventh Circuit’s decision in Meza-Rodriguez should be applied
by future courts faced with the decision of applying the Second
Amendment to undocumented immigrants. Not only is the Seventh
Circuit’s decision a fair result considering the application of the First,
Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments to undocumented
immigrants, but the application of the Martinez-Aguero test allows for a
more predictable test for courts to apply in the future.
B. Strict Scrutiny – National Origin
After confidently holding that Mr. Meza-Rodriguez should be
included within the scope of “people” provided a Second Amendment
right to bear arms, the Seventh Circuit missed a great opportunity to
apply strict scrutiny to the Act.117 It is well settled that any
“classification based upon . . . race, alienage, and national origin are
inherently suspect and must therefore be subjected to close judicial
scrutiny.”118 Strict scrutiny has been routinely referred to as “strict in
theory, but fatal in fact,” with the government failing to meet the
standard on multiple occasions.119 In order to survive a strict scrutiny
analysis, the government must prove that the legislation under analysis
is “narrowly tailored to further compelling governmental interests.”120
Therefore, the government must prove that any legislation challenged as
unconstitutional under strict scrutiny analysis must directly further a
compelling governmental interest. The fundamental question that needs
to be answered in this scenario is whether the Second Amendment rights
of undocumented immigrants may be infringed in order for the
government to further its interest in keeping track of firearms within the
United States.
Although the text of 922 (g)(5) does not facially discriminate against
117.
118.
119.
120.

See Meza-Rodriguez, 798 F.3d at 664.
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 682 (1973).
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 326 (2003).
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a particular race, alienage, or national origin, 922 (g)(5) clearly has a
disparate impact on undocumented immigrants, particularly nationals of
Mexico, Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador. To tighten the
connection between the application of strict scrutiny and 922 (g)(5)’s
treatment of undocumented immigrants, the only difference between
those who the Act applies and those who 922 (g)(5) does not apply, is
national origin. Thus, as it is well-settled that national origin is a
classification that requires the use of strict scrutiny, the Act’s impact
upon undocumented immigrants should by analyzed under the high
standard of strict scrutiny.
The government would assert that the compelling governmental
interest served by the Act as a whole is the ability of the government to
keep track of firearms within the United States. Additionally, the
government would also assert that the ability to keep track of firearms in
this scenario is vital to its ability to prevent criminal activity due to the
fact that undocumented immigrants are not easily tracked. At first blush,
the government’s argument seems credible. However, a deeper analysis
of the government’s interest reveals a much different underlying
purpose behind the Act. Considering the light restrictions that must be
satisfied for a United States citizen to purchase a firearm in the United
States, it appears that tracking firearms is not much of a priority. 121 With
several loopholes available to United States citizens that would like to
remain anonymous while purchasing a firearms,122 the government’s
purpose behind the Act seems to rely heavily on the fact that the Act
targets individuals based on national origin.
Also, while tracking firearms is definitely a noble pursuit, the
government has not shown much of an appetite when it comes to
tracking interstate purchases of firearms by United States citizens. Even
American citizens who have previously been under the careful watch of
law enforcement agencies are not typically found to have committed any
crimes by simply possessing a firearm.123 Furthermore, there is little
evidence to support the idea that if the government is aware of the
identity of the owner of firearm, the government will automatically
know the whereabouts of the firearm at issue. Additionally, even if the
government is aware of the location of every firearm within the United
121. Audrey Carlsen and Sahil Chinoy, How to Buy a Gun in 15 Countries, THE TORONTO STAR,
https://www.thestar.com/news/world/2018/03/02/how-to-buy-a-gun-in-15-countries.html (last visited
Mar. 12, 2018).
122. Kiannah Sepeda-Miller, Fact-check: Tammy Duckworth on Target in “Gun Show Loophole”
Claim, CHICAGO SUN TIMES, https://chicago.suntimes.com/crime/tammy-duckworth-gun-showloophole-background-check-claim-politifact-fact-check/ (last visited Aug. 31, 2018).
123. Meribah Knight, Waffle House Shooting Underscores How Gun Laws Vary From State to
State, NPR, https://www.npr.org/2018/04/23/605103200/waffle-house-shooting-underscores-how-gunlaws-vary-from-state-to-state (last visited Apr. 24, 2018).
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States, it is highly unlikely that law enforcement would be able to use
that information to prevent the owner of a firearm from using the
firearm in a negative manner.
Even if the government’s assertion that keeping track of firearms
within the United States is accepted as a compelling interest, there is
little reason to believe that 922 (g)(5)’s impact is narrowly tailored to
serve the government’s interest. Surely there are alternatives to
restricting the Second Amendment rights of undocumented immigrants
in order to keep track of firearms within the United States.
As stated earlier, the United States government has not made parallel
efforts to ensure that the location of firearms owned by American
citizens are known by law enforcement.124 For example, consider the
Second Amendment rights of an American citizen that has committed a
misdemeanor in comparison to an undocumented immigrant that has
committed no other crime but remaining in the United States without
documentation. The application of 922 (g)(5) to the American citizen
would not result in the infringement of Second Amendment rights, while
the Second Amendment rights of the undocumented immigrant would
clearly be infringed. The application of 922 (g)(5) in this scenario
clearly illustrates that (i) 922 (g)(5) discriminates based on national
origin, (ii) 922 (g)(5) has a disparate impact on undocumented
immigrants, and (iii) application of 922 (g)(5) is not narrowly tailored to
the government’s compelling interest in keeping track of firearms within
the United States, rather, 922 (g)(5) is under-inclusive considering its
application to American citizens.
The Meza court incorrectly applied 922 (g) precedent in holding that
there is no reason to distinguish between other provisions of 922 (g) and
922 (g)(5).125 There is a significant difference. There are no other
provisions within 922 (g) that specifically highlight individuals that are
not lawfully within the United States. The constitutional concerns that
apply under 922 (g)(5) are drastically different from the other provisions
of 922 (g).
While the Act is not facially discriminatory, an analysis under YickWo to determine if the Act is discriminatory as-applied to certain
national groups is required. Although the focus of this article does not
include deportation of undocumented immigrants, it is relevant to
discuss the connection between convictions under the Act and statistics
regarding the deportation of undocumented immigrants. For the years
2014 through 2016, nationals from Mexico, Guatemala, Honduras, and
El Salvador combine to represent a striking 94.3% of all deportations

124. Id.
125. See Meza, 2014 US Dist. LEXIS 50485 at 6.
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from the United States.126 Although the percentage of deportations
based on criminal activity is actually quite low,127 922 (g)(5) is among
the top ranked lead charges for immigration convictions in U.S. District
Courts.128 Between 2008 and 2017, an annual average of roughly threehundred undocumented immigrants are prosecuted under the Act.129
Considering increasing co-operation between local law enforcement
and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”), mere charges
under 922 (g)(5) can result in deportation for undocumented
immigrants.130 The relationship between local law enforcement and ICE
establishes a substantial connection from charges or convictions under
922 (g)(5) directly to the proportion of nationals from Mexico,
Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador that are deported from the
United States. Simply put, it is almost guaranteed that undocumented
immigrants charged or convicted under 922 (g)(5) will be deported.
Furthermore, bearing in mind the percentage of all deportees that are
nationals of Mexico, Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador, there is a
high likelihood that undocumented immigrants charged or convicted
under the Act will be deported to one of the aforementioned countries.
Under Yick-Wo, if a facially neutral law is applied unfairly to a
particular group based on national origin, heightened scrutiny is
required. Furthermore, the Abcarian court directly addressed
disproportional application of laws by highlighting the potential for law
enforcement to oppress unpopular groups with the use of facially neutral
laws.131 Similar to the Chinese business owners in Yick-Wo, considering
the statistics presented above, nationals from Mexico, Guatemala,
Honduras, and El Salvador have had facially neutral laws applied to
them in a highly disproportionate manner.
Proponents of the Act will argue that nationals from Mexico,
Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador are the most numerous
undocumented immigrants in the United States. While true, that
argument essentially highlights that the Act unfairly targets
126. Latest
Data:
Immigration
and
Customs
Enforcement
Removals,
http://trac.syr.edu/phptools/immigration/remove/ (Last visited Mar. 12, 2018).
127. Nature of Charge in New Filings Seeking Removal Orders Through July 2018,
http://trac.syr.edu/phptools/immigration/charges/apprep_newfiling_charge.php (Last visited Aug. 31,
2018).
128. Immigration
Convictions
for
February
2018,
http://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/bulletins/immigration/monthlyfeb18/gui/ (Last visited Mar. 12, 2018).
129. Federal
Weapons
Prosecutions
Rise
for
Third
Consecutive
Year,
http://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/crim/492/ (Last visited Mar. 12, 2018).
130. Alex Horton, A California Sheriff is Posting Inmate Release Dates to Help ICE Capture
Undocumented Immigrants, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2018/03/27/a-califsheriff-is-skirting-state-sanctuary-laws-to-help-ice-capture-undocumentedimmigrants/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.2f7093df2134 (Last visited Mar. 12, 2018).
131. Abcarian, 617 F.3d at 940.
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undocumented immigrants of certain national origins. Therefore, if the
Act undoubtedly targets individuals of certain national origins, there is
no question that strict scrutiny should be applied in determining the
constitutionality of the Act.
C. Regulating Criminal Activity with the Commerce Clause
Chief Justice Rehnquist’s opinion in Lopez is directly analogous to
current applications of the Act. The Court foreshadowed other
applications under 922 (g) as violating Congress’ power under the
Commerce Clause. The third prong of the test outlined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist is imperative to the analysis of 922 (g)(5). 132 The Act exposes
undocumented immigrants to a potential criminal conviction simply for
possessing a firearm. Using Chief Justice Rehnquist’s direct language in
Lopez, “[t]he possession of a gun in a local school zone is in no sense an
economic activity that might . . . substantially affect any sort of
interstate commerce.”133 If the possession of a firearm in a specified
place does not substantially affect any sort of interstate commerce, how
can the possession of a firearm by an undocumented immigrant affect
interstate commerce? The government’s “cost of crime” argument was
rejected by the Court because the connection between the possession of
a firearm within a school zone and interstate commerce required too
many inferences.
An undocumented immigrant’s possession of a firearm does not have
any more rational relation to interstate commerce than the possession of
a firearm within a school zone. Congress simply does not have the
power to regulate criminal activity under the guise of Commerce Clause
power. Under Morrison, aggregating each undocumented immigrant’s
possession of a firearm is not permitted. Therefore, it is difficult to
imagine a scenario that 922 (g)(5) substantially affects interstate
commerce.
IV. CONCLUSION
Undocumented immigrants are undoubtedly “people.” It is
disingenuous for courts to apply the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth
Amendments to all persons within the United States while holding that
undocumented immigrants do not have the Second Amendment right to
bear arms. The Martinez-Aguero test applied by the Seventh Circuit in
Meza-Rodriguez should be applied by courts seeking to analyze whether

132. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-559.
133. Id. at 567.
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or not undocumented immigrants possess Second Amendment rights.
The Martinez-Aguero standard takes into account an individual’s
connection and commitment to the United States, while providing a fair
standard to undocumented immigrants that have established substantial
connections to the United States.
The Seventh Circuit was correct in determining that, depending on
the circumstances, undocumented immigrants are to be considered
people, but the Meza-Rodriguez court should have gone further to
require the use of strict scrutiny in analyzing 922 (g)(5). It is without
question that the Act prohibits undocumented immigrants from
possessing firearms. It is also without question that undocumented
immigrants are classified as “aliens” because they are foreign nationals.
Discriminating against certain groups because of national origin is only
permitted where the government can pass the test of strict scrutiny. 134
Alternatively, under a Yick-Wo analysis, considering the above
statistics related to the deportation of nationals from Mexico,
Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador, the Act should be analyzed
under strict scrutiny due to the as-applied impact to undocumented
immigrants from the aforementioned countries. It is well-settled that the
Fourteenth Amendment applies not only to citizens of the United States,
but to all individuals within the United States at any given time. While
the impact to nationals from Mexico, Guatemala, Honduras, and El
Salvador is heavily impacted by the proximity to the United States, the
impact in how 922 (g)(5) is applied is unquestionably disparate.
Finally, Congress has violated the Commerce Clause power delegated
by the Constitution. Taken together, Lopez and Morrison clearly limit
Congress’ Commerce Clause power to enact legislation that has a
substantial effect on interstate commerce. Further, Congress cannot
aggregate minor effects on interstate into a larger, substantial effect on
interstate commerce.135 The possession of firearms by undocumented
immigrants does not have a substantial effect on interstate commerce.
Without evidence of a substantial effect on interstate commerce,
Congress’ attempt to limit criminal activity is not permitted within the
powers delegated by the Commerce Clause.

134. See Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 356.
135. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 617.
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